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AN OLD PROBLEM IN A MODERN GUISE:
CHAIN STORES AND EFFICIENT INTEGRATION
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
By

WILLIAM

H.

STANFORD, JR.*

Horizontal or vertical integration affords a means for
the elimination of competition, and for the expansion of
monopoly power which already exists.' When a business
makes or sells more than one product the business is horizontally integrated. When it transfers goods or services,
which could be sold in the market, without making great
changes from one of its departments to another, it is called
a vertically integrated firm. Advantages of large-scale vertical and horizontal integration have been clearly revealed
in criminal prosecutions by the Department of Justice
against A & P2 and its two largest competitors.3 These
chains are integrated both vertically and horizontally. They
have reached to the "rear" by establishing their own purchasing agents and they have reached "laterally" in that
they are composed of thousands of food stores combined
into metropolitan "units" and extensive regional "divisions." The predatory activities which flow from these
chains' employment of vertical and horizonal integration
have been condemned under the Sherman Act.'
In the present divestiture suit against A & P, the Government insists, as it has in the past, that the only way that
chains can be purged of their alleged "evils" is by breaking
them into separate local chains and divorcing their manufacturing and other subsidiaries from their present owner*Assistant Professor of Law, Cumberland University, Lebanon,
1.
2.

Tenn.
See the excellent discussion in BURNS, DECLINE OF COMPETITION
418, 431-45 (1936).
United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp.

626 (E.D. Ill. 1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
3. United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., United States v. Kroger
Grocery and Baking Co., 51 F. Supp. 448 (D. Kan. 1943), indictments sustained in Frankfort Distilleries v. United States, 144
F.2d 824 (10tn Cir. 1944).
4. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1946).
(219)
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ship.5 Hence, this civil suit by the Government against A & P
presents an old problem in a modern guise-the effect of
rapid chain store growth and development, through the
instrumentality of efficient integration, upon traditional
marketing arrangements. Since efficient integration as a
per se offense under the Sherman Act is the principal topic
proposed for discussion in this article, it is believed that
it is first necessary to review briefly the types of legislation
directed by states and the Federal Government against the
concerted economic power of chain organizations, the effect
of this legislation upon chain store growth and development,
and the socio economic implications of chain store expansion.
I.

STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION

A4. AJ War Ayainst Concentration of Economic Power
The rapid growth and expansion of large chain store systems since the turn of the twentieth century has had a farreaching effect upon traditional marketing arrangements
The effect of this economic phenomenon attracted the attention of Congress early in 1928 when the Senate ordered
the Federal Trade Commission to conduct an investigation
of chain store practices and to determine their legality under the anti-trust and fair trade laws.7 As a result of this
investigation, the Robinson-Patman Act,' an amendment to
the Clayton Act,' was enacted in 1936 to outlaw various
kinds of price discriminations which were considered largely
responsible for chain store growth and development."0 In
5.

6.

The Nashville Tennessean, Jan. 22, 1950, p. 6-b, col. 1. The
"divestiture" suit was instituted in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.
A senator once called chain stores "the most startling development of monopoly in our country at the present moment (1931)."

Quoted in

BECKMAN AND NOLEN, THE CHAIN-STORE PROBLEM

216

(1938).
7. S. R. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.; 69 Cong. Rec. 8522 (1932).
8. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1946).
9. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 etseq. (1946).
10. See Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 8442,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ; Report of House Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 8442, H. R. REP. No. 2287, pt. III, 74th Cong.,
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a bill which sought to impose a tax on the chains based
upon the number of retail stores which the chains owned
was introduced in Congress." Although this bill was defeated, similar though somewhat less severe taxes have been
levelled at the chains by various state legislatures. 2 State
price discrimination laws,' 3 resale price maintenance laws,"
and sales below cost acts' 5 are additional methods employed
to cope with the problem which the chain store has presented. Naturally, anti-chain store legislation has received its
greatest impetus from storekeepers to whom the crushing
effect of chain store economic power has become the utmost
symbol of unfairness.16
1939

B. Results Obtained By Legislation
State price discrimination laws and sales below cost acts
have been particularly burdensome not only because the
chains sell a great number of fast-moving perishable prod2d Sess. (1936) ; FTC, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, SEN. Doc. No. 86, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) ; id. (Grocery
Trade), SEN. Doc. No. 89, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) ; id. (Drug
Trade), SEN. Doc. No. 94, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933).
11. H. R. 1, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
12. The Patman Tax Bill on Chain Stores, 2 TRADE REG. REV. No. 4

(Winter 1938) ; LEE, ANTI-CHAIN
Statutes collected in CCH CHAIN

STORE TAX LEGISLATION (1939);
STORE TAX LAWS (1937).

13.

Some of the state price discrimination laws are patterned upon
the Federal Robinson-Patman Act, while others merely prohibit
the sale of goods by a person at one place in the state at a lower
price than in another place for destroying competition. Feldman,
Legislative Opposition to Chain Stores and Its Minimization, 8
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 334, 341 (1941).
14. Legislation of this type, including the Federal Miller-Tydings
Act, purports to protect manufacturers of branded articles from
ha- ing the good will of their products injured by price-cutting
dealers. Strong evidence indicates that the movement really began
with organizations of retailers. See Minority view of the members
of the Committee on the District of Columbia, Part 2, of Senate
Report of July 8, 1937.
15. Sales below cost acts are laws which are directed at the elimination of "loss-leaders," a policy which has been widely attributed

to chain stores. See the excellent discussion in

LEBHOR, THE CHAIN

STORE: BOON OR BANE? 178, 182-183 (1932).
16.

LAZO, CONTROLLED COMPETITION,
COOPERATIVES 8

(1939).

CORPORATE CHAINS, CARTELS AND
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ucts at a price close to the market but also because the
statutes state that markups are to be added to the current
list price of the articles. The price is subject to a number
of discounts which the chains are unable to pass legally, in
whole or in part, to the consumer. 7
Taxes impose a higher tax burden on chains but a higher
cost of living is the price the consumer must pay in order to
reap the full benefits of tax legislation."8
Experience has shown that legislation such as the state
resale price maintenance laws and the Federal Miller-Tydings Act prevent a distributor who purchases in large quantities from legitimately passing savings along to the consumer, although efficient distribution would ordinarily allow it to buy and sell at lower prices than the less efficient
distributor and organizer."9
The Robinson-Patman Act is vague and ambiguous and
many sellers have found it difficult to determine whether
their pricing systems meet its requirements." Brokerage
payments to any but independent brokers are prohibited by
Section 2 (c). This prevents a retailer from integrating to
the "rear" into the brokerage field, unless he wishes to obtain advantages which will compensate him for the cost of
the integration. Even if brokerage payments only make
proper allowances for cost differentials, they are illegal.
Hence, the section absolutely prohibits the granting of price
concessions to customers in recognition of the economy obtained by avoiding payment of a brokerage commission.
The chief economist of the Federal Trade Commission has
this to say about Section 2 (c) ". . . portions of the Robinson-Patman Act cannot be justified as efforts to reconcile
efficiency with curbs upon excessive bargaining power . . .
The provisions about brokerage run directly counter to the
21

17. A & P Goes to the Wars, Fortune, April, 1938, p. 63.
18.
19.

TRADE REG. REV. 15 (Dec. 1936).

Grether, Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation

Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 640 (1936).
20. Trial Brief for Defendants, pp. 205-254, United States v. New
York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946);
see note 2 supra.
21. Great A & P Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 625, 60 S. Ct. 380, 84 L. Ed. 521 (1940).
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cost principle. By eliminating the opportunity for sellers
who do not use brokers to offer buying inducements, it goes
far to give such brokers a legally supported monopoly of
distribution in the lines in which they are already well established.""2
To be sure, legislation has had a direct bearing on the
welfare of chains. Yet, legislation has not achieved its purpose 2:3 because efficiency of this system of merchandizing
permits the realization of savings in the cost of transfer
through the employment of large-scale vertical and horizontal integration. Savings in the cost of transfer give to the
chains the economic power to exclude competitors and the
record reveals that this power has been used to crush competitors. "
II. SocIo-ECONOMIC

IMPLICATIONS OF

CHAIN STORE EXPANSION

J. Chain Store Practices
Chain store practices accentuate the tendency of chains
toward monopoly with all its "evil" social and economic
consequences to the American public. The following prac22.
23.

MAINTAINING COMPETITION 168-169 (1949).
During the nineteen-twenties chain stores increased in members
and their volume of business quadrupled. In 1923 chain stores
accounted for only 8% of the retail business while in 1929 they
accounted for 18% of retail trade. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY
EDWARDS,

OF CORPORATIONS

451 (3d Ed. 1932). By 1943 chain stores had

29.8% of the retail food trade. United States v. New York Great
A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 633 (E.D. Ill. 1946). At the end of
the fiscal year 1946, A & P reported a 33% gain in the total food
sales from the previous year. This was. nearly half a billion
dollars greater than the previous high recorded in 1942. The trend
benefited all mass merchandisers. Food chain sales gained 29.9%
over 1945 while the independents had only a 17.4% gain. Business
Week, Feb. 22, 1947, pp. 55-58.
24. A brief but highly illuminating comment supporting this conclusion may be found in BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 10-28 (1940).
25. United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1949) ; see note 2 supra.
26. FTC, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, SEN. Doc.
No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
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tices of A & P, which flow from that chain's use of largescale vertical and horizontal integration, are fairly typical
of chain store activities :21
(i.) Use of mass purchasing power to obtain price and other
preferences from manufacturers and suppliers by threatenng to
manufacture and buy elsewhere;
(2.) Obtaining, through a multitude of devices, discriminatory price preferences from manufacturers and dealers;
(3.) Using the profits made in one area of trade, where a
dominant position has been obtained, to finance the operation of
stores in areas where competition is severe and the chain's policy
is to sell below cost;
(4.) Using a subsidiary corporation as a purchasing agent, the
subsidiary assuming an inconsistent position by also acting as
selling agent for 'arious producers and merchandizing jobbers
of the chain's retail competitors, for the specific purpose of exacting profits which are ultimately realized by the chain. 2"

The records of the A & P Company demonstrate the
economic power of expansion, horizontal or vertical, with
clearness which is difficult to surpass. 2' The New York Corporation and The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company
of America are holding companies, the first holding stock
of the latter, and the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company of America holding the stock of twelve subsidiary corporations. This group retails food through its chain of
stores and also processes, packs, and wholesales food products, and engages in brokerage business in such products.
All of the territory in which A & P operates was zoned
into divisions in 1925, and there have been seven divisions
since 1938. In 1938 A & P's sales were 26.6% of the total
chain store food business, which aggregated 23.6% of the
total food business in the United States. Its percentage of
retail trade was 7.1% of the total food business in the
United States in 1943. By 1946 the latter figure mounted
to io% of the total food trade. Operated through the in27. Ibid.

28.

United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp.

29.

626 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
Government Exhibit 103, United States v. New York Great A & P
Tea Co., supra note 25.
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strumentality of the defendant corporations, the unincorporated divisions usually divide this retail trade. Some of
thes defendant corporations give financial assistance to the
operating companies and their subsidiaries; manufacturing
plants are maintained by others; and one of them operates
four Alaska canneries. The Atlantic Commission Company
acts as a purchasing agent for A & P shippers; it also acts
as a food broker for competing grocery concerns and turns
profits made from this activity over to A & P. In short, it
appears that the A & P chain, which had its beginning in
1859 with a single store in New York City and a merchandizing policy of low selling prices made possible by large
scale buying, is a modern economic giant straddling the food
industry from the seed sowed by the farmer to the consumer's table."
A & P has been convicted of a deliberate scheme, conceived in 1925 and carried on for over 20 years, to expand
its control of the retail grocery market at the expense of its
competitors and the consuming public by boycotts, blacklisting, price wars, threats and other devices. Many small
businesses have been destroyed; manufacturers, farmers and
A & P's competitors in the grocery field have been forced
to pay tribute to A & P. And the entire cost of this program,
which is fairly typical of chain store activities, is passed
on to the American public.31
B. Efficient Integration Confers A Destructive
Competitive Advantage
Summing up the evidence concerning ACCO in the criminal case, the United States District Court said:
"The Atlantic Commission Company, a subsidiary incorporated in 1926, ostensibly to purchase produce for A & P, from the
beginning acted with the full approval of headquarters, as purchasing agent for A & P and as sales agent for certain suppliers.
In oher words, while buying A & P's needs from producers, it
30. United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp.
626 (E.D. Ill.
1946),
31. Atlas, Your Dollars at Stake: The Growing War Against Trusts,
Everybody's Digest, Feb. 1950, pp. 5-10.
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was also representing as broker for outside sales the same producers or others similarly situated as well as buying broker for
competing produce dealers and as merchandizing jobber in the
general market . . . Its practices over the years leave a bad odor.
It exploited its inconsistent position; it collected brokerage from
others for A & P's coffers; its position and its practices created a
sharp differential between A & P's purchases of produce and those
of its competitors. It persistently selected the higher quality of
produce for A & P and the less desirable for its outside buyers,
thus securing for A & P not only a buying price differential but
also a preference in quality." 3

In other words, A & P took the farmer's best produce
at the lowest price and resold it in A & P stores. The inferior produce was sold to A & P's competitors at prices
which were necessarily higher. For this privilege of being
exploited by A & P, farmers were charged a commission on
their own produce sold to them by A & P. This commission
was another rebate which was not available to A & P's
competitors.
The court continued:
"ACCO made a determined and persistent effort to establish
a close relationship with and influence over growers' cooperatives
(citing examples) . . . The expressions of Baum (ACCO's general manager) at various times and places indicate a desire to

delve into the cooperative business of his producers and, if not
to control it, at least to guide and influence it . . . In some in-

stances the cooperative managers were on ACCO's payroll, and
in at least one instance, when not engaged by the cooperative
the manager was employed by ACCO. In various and diverse
matters, ACCO came to enjoy a singularly close influence over,
if not, indeed, control of, various cooperatives." 33
"In addition to its interest in and influence over cooperatives
ACCO created contact committees of producers in various parts
of the country, selecting the chairman and, through the chairman, the members. Upon these committees, its competitors had

little or no representation. Government agencies were attempting to coordinate distribution. ACCO, for some reason, deemed
32. United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp.
626, 655 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
33. Id. at 659-660.
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it necessary to form its own contact committees . .. One reading the evidence can only conclude that ACCO's intention was
to bring produce sellers more closely within ACCO's influence
and to bring about a situation whereby growers and shippers
relied more and more on ACCO's facilities and advice .... 34

The record reveals that A & P used these dominated
farmer contact committees to undermine produce markets,
to exploit low priced produce which was unavailable to
A & P customers, all at the expense of the farmer.
ACCO's activities permitted A & P to realize savings in
the cost of transfer. Since ACCO is highly efficient the conclusion follows that efficient integration confers a destructive competitive advantage to chain stores."
The record also demonstrates that A & P consciously set
out to expand its retail sales and destroy its competitors by
conducting unscrupulous price wars, by coercing rebates
from manufacturers, by exacting commissions from farmers through ACCO, by the manipulation of stock gains, and
by other predatory practices. By these means A & P increased its gross sales from $330,000,000 in 1925 to almost
$2,ooo,ooo,ooo in 1947.2

Commenting on the evidence in the criminal case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
said this about A & P's horizontal integration:
"If Area X is having a tough experience competitionwise, or
the area looks prospective in which to increase the volume of
business, the gross profit percentage in this area is lowered. This
lowers the price at which goods may be sold and the volume increases at the expense of somebody. Sometimes the gross profit
rate is fixed so low that the store runs below the cost of operation, even with all the advantage derived by the store in the re34. Id. at 658-659.
35. The FTC in its chain store report had this to say about the multiple inconsistant roles of the chains' purchasing agents:

...

it

is not difficult to see that the ultimate result will be to accentuate whatever tendency there may be in the evolution of chainstore systems toward monopoly." FTC, Final Report on the Chain
Store Investigation, SEN. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 50
(1934).

36. Business Week, Feb. 22, 1947, pp. 55-58.
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duction of the cost of its merchandise occasioned by the headquarters' allocation of its predatory profits and accumulations.
When the gross profit rate is reduced in Area X, it is an almost
irresistible conclusion that A & P had the power to compensate
for any possible decline in net profits by raising the gross profit
rate and retail prices in Area Y, where it was in a competitive
position to do so. The record is replete with instances of deliberate reductions of gross profit rates in selected areas. Thus Area
Y, at the desire of the policy makers of A & P, can be brought
to aid in the struggle in Area X, which in numerous instances,
as the record shows, sustained heavy net losses for periods extending over a substantial number of consecutive years. There must
inevitably be a compensation somewhere in the system for a loss
somewhere else, as the overall policy of the company is to earn
$7.00 per share per annum on its stock." 3

In other words, by this vicious process A & P destroyed
many small independent business men and A & P alone
gained from this destruction. Consumers who bought from
A & P stores in other areas paid the cost of destroying the
small independent in areas where A & P made sales below
cost. Efficient horizontal integration permits A & P to
realize savings in the cost of transfer. Therefore, efficient
horizontal integration confers a destructive competitive
advantage to A & P which makes this vicious process possible.
In the present civil action there are no new charges
against A & P. The Government merely charges the activities of which A & P has been found guilty and for which
fines have been imposed." The Government in this suit
realizes that A & P's efficient vertical and horizontal inte37. United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79,
87 (7th Cir. 1949).
38. "McGrath asserted the suit was deemed essential as a follow up
on A & P's conviction at Danville, Ill., in September, 1946, on a
criminal charge of conspiring to restrain and monopolize trade
in the food industry. The company paid $175,000 in fines after
the conviction was affirmed in the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals
at Chicago early last year.
"'The . . . case in Ncw York,' said the Attorney General, 'was
to guard against a repetition of the practices which were found
illegal in the criminal proceeding'." The Nashville Tennessean,
Jan. 22, 1950, p. 6-b, col. 2.
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gration give it a competitive advantage which leaves the
American public helpless before it. The courts are asked to
remove A & P's power further to destroy competition in
the food industry.
III. EFFICIENT INTEGRATION: A PER SE OFFENSE
A. The Policy of the Sherman Act
Speaking for the Court in Apex Hosiery Company v.
Leader," Mr. Justice Stone said:
"... it [The Sherman Act] was enacted in the era of 'trusts'
and of 'combinations' of businesses and of capital organized and
directed to control of the market by suppression of competition
in the marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency
of which had become a matter of public concern. The end sought
was the prevention of restraints to free competition in business
and commercial transactions which tend to restrict production,
raise prices or otherwise control the market to the letriment of
purchasers or corsumers of goods and services, all of which had
come to be regarded as a special form of public injury."

The Sherman Act was designed to foster and maintain
competition in a competitive society-a society wherein the
goal is to get the best of someone and where only the strong
survive, Good business sense receives approval under the
Act, but when the game of competition becomes too unfair
government intervention under the statute becomes necessary."
Size alone is insufficient to bring a defendant within the
condemnation of the Act." The questions in a Sherman Act
decision are:
Does this business or combination
power to control prices?
(i)

of businesses have

39. 310 U.S. 469, 492, 60 S. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311 (1940).
40. Clark, Monopolistic Tendencies, Their Character and Consequences, 18 PROC. ACAD. POL. Sci. 124 (1939). Richberg, The
Monopoly Issue, 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 375 (1939).
41. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451,
40 S. Ct. 293, 64 L. Ed. 343, 8 A.L.R. 1121 (1920) ; United States
v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708, 47 S. Ct. 748,
71 L. Ed. 1302 (1927) ; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131, 174, 68 S.Ct. 915, 92 L. Ed. 1260 (1948).
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(2)
Is it engaged in competitive practice or practices wh:ch
destroy competitors ?42

Benefit or detriment to the consumer is a question which
has come before the court in many cases which have arisen
under the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for
the Court in Nash v. United States,4 ennunciated this principle: ".

.

. only such contracts and combinations are with-

in the act as, by reason of intent or the inherent nature of
the contemplated acts, prejudice the public interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the course
of trade.""
In the A & P case Judge Lindley said:
"Combina ion that leads directly to lo.er prices to the consumer may, even as agalnst the consu'r-e-, be restraint of trade;
and combination t'-at leads direc ly to higher prices may, as
against the producer, be restraint of trade. The sa ue, thus interpreted, has no concern x ith prices, but looks solely to com-

petition, and to the giving of competition full play, by making
illegal any effort at restriction upon competition. '" '
Clearly then, a monopoly contrary to the policies of the
Sherman Act can exist even though the combination may
temporarily or even permanently reduce the price at which
articles are manufactured or sold; the selling price of an
article does not necessarily indicate the nonexistence of a
conspiracy to monopolize or the existence of a purpose to
sell at low prices for the ultimate benefit of the public. 6
B. The Meaning of "Conspiracy"
Prior to the criminal cases against A & P and its two
42. United States v. International Harvester Co., supra note 41.
43. 229 U.S. 373, 33 S. Ct. 780, 57 L. Ed. 1232 (1913).
44. Id. at 376. Other cases which consider public benefit or detriment
are: Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S.
30, 51 S. Ct. 42, 75 L. Ed. 145 (1930) ; Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix
Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1938) ; and Columbia River
Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970 (D. Ore. 1939).
45. United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626,
636 (E.D. Ill.
1946).
46. Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 61
S. Ct. 703, 85 L. Ed. 949 (1941).
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largest competitors, courts had seized upon the independence of both vertical17 and horizontal 8 integrations to find
the necessary parties for a conspiracy. Viewing this doctrine in the light of recent decisions 4 -- that a conspiracy
under the Sherman Act exists where there is conscious participation and acquiescence in a course of conduct which
tends to result in a restraint of trade-it is clear that very
little difficulty is experienced in finding a conspiracy among
multicorporate business enterprises.
C. Chain Store Predatory ActivitiesIndependently Considered
Evoking preferences from suppliers by threats to manufacture and to buy elsewhere are practices which should be
condemned under the Sherman Act. Group boycotts have
received almost unanimous condemnation." Only occasionUnited States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618, 62 S. Ct. 105, 86 L. Ed. 497
(1941). The General Motors Corp. (the parent manufacturing
organization), the General Motors Sales Corp. (a subsidiary selling organization , and the General Motors Acceptance Corp. of
Ind. (two subsidiary finance organizations) were convicted of
conspiracy to suppress competition in the financing of General
Motors cars. "Nor can the appellants enjoy the benefits of separate corporate identity and escape the consequences of an illegal
combination in restraint of trade by insisting that they are in
effect a single trader." 121 F.2d at 404.
48. The affiliated corporations of motion picture exhibitor chains were
convicted of conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade by using
their mass buying power to obtain contracts with distributors by
which the competition of other exhibitors was suppressed, in
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 65 S. Ct.
254, 89 L. Ed. 160 (1944).
49. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 62 S. Ct. 1070, 86
L. Ed. 1461 (1942) ; Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S.
208, 59 S. Ct. 467, 83 L. Ed. 610 (1939) ; Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 66 S. Ct. 574, 90 L. Ed., 652 (1946),
reversing 150 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1945).
50. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30,
51 S. Ct. 42, 75 L. Ed. 145 (1930); United States v. First Nat.
Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44, 51 S. Ct. 45, 75 L. Ed. 151 (1930);
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 44 S. Ct. 96, 68
L. Ed. 308 (1923); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n
v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 34 S. Ct. 951, 58 L: Ed. 1490
(1914).

47.
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ally have there been indications that a boycott under certain circumstances may be justified." The Court in Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC,2 speaks of the mere existence
of a boycott as one of the respects in which the defendants'
plan violated the Sherman Act. And while many of the boycotts struck down by the courts have been for ends which
could not legally have been achieved by combination,53 the
emphasis of the opinions is usually not on ends but on the
mere utilization of a boycott. 4 The "coercive" effect-the
fact that those boycotted are deprived of an opportunity
to accept or reject voluntarily the boycotter's policies-has
been repeatedly mentioned." In the icases where information
has been given on the economic power of the combination,
the combination did hold a dominant position in the indus6
try.

The size and financial resources of chain organizations
perpetuating an individual boycott are significant. Since
51.

52.
53.

54.

55.

56.

See United States v. American Livestock Commission Co., 279
U.S. 435, 437, 438, 49 S. Ct. 425, 73 L. Ed., 787 (1929) ; Butterick
Pub. Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1936).
312 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 703, 85 L. Ed. 949 (1941).
Compare Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810
(3d Cir. 1921) (boycott), with Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502 (1911) (agreement), where the ends sought w3re resale price maintenance.
Authority seems to be lacking cn this point but it appears that
the objectives of the defendants in Paramount Famous Lasky
Corp. v. United States, 232 U.S. 30, 51 S. Ct. 42, 75 L. Ed. 145
(1930) and in First Nat. Piztures, Inc. v. United States, 282 U.S.
44, 51 S. Ct. 45, 75 L. Ed. 151 (1930), could legally have been
achieved if a boycott had not been used. See remarks of Gilbert
H. Montague in FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAws-A SYMPoSIuM 31
(1932).
See, for example, Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n
v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614, 34 S. Ct. 951, 58 L. Ed. 1490
(1914); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282
U.S. 30, 42, 51 S. Ct. 42, 75 L. Ed. 145 (1930); cf. the remarks
of Gilbert H. Montague and of John W. Davis in the FEDERAL
ANTI-TRUST LAws-A SYMPOSIUM 31 (1932).
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 44 S. Ct. 96, 68
L. Ed. 308 (1923) (all) ; Ramsa'y Co. v. Associated Bill Posters,
260 U.S. 501, 43 S. Ct. 167, 67 L. Ed. 368 (1922) ("very large"
national membership) ; Mines v. Scribner, 147 Fed. 927 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1906) (90%) ; cf. Southern Hardware Jobbers' Ass'n v. FTC,
290 Fed. 773 (5th Cir. 1923).
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many smaller businesses rely on the larger chains for their
regular trade, on principle it appears that the deleterious
effect upon competition is at least as great as, if not greater
than, the effect produced by a group of small traders employing this weapon, and that the practice is clearly illegal
under the Sherman Act. 7
A court experiences little difficulty in finding a violation
of the Sherman Act when the evidence discloses that the
suppliers granted discriminatory preferences to a buyer.
The Court had occasion to speak on this point in Terminal
Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvan'ia R. Co." The warehouse
company brought an action for treble damages under Section 7 of the Sherman Act against the railroad, alleging that
by granting a discriminatory rate to a competitor the railroad had engaged in a combination in restraint of trade and
had thus violated Section i of the Sherman Act. The case
stands for the proposition that, "Discriminatory privileges
and payments given by a carrier to a consignor or consignee
are unavailing without more to make out a combination in
restraint of trade or commerce within the meaning of the
anti-trust laws. To lead to that result, the privileges or payments must be the symptoms or incidents of an enveloping
conspiracy with its own illegal ends.""9 However, recent
anti-trust cases involving movie distributors and exhibitors
indicate that the present Supreme Court is imbued with a
philosophy which differs from that expressed by Justice
Cardozo in the Terminal Warehouse Co. case. A chain organization employing its mass purchasing power to gain an
advantage over its competitors by receiving price discriminations not only violates the Robinson-Patman Act but is
also guilty of "an unlawful restraint in itself."6
Sales below cost of doing business, when employed for
the purpose of destroying competition in local areas, are
57.
58.

See Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. Rvv.
(1936).
297 U.S. 500, 56 S. Ct. 546, 80 L. Ed. 827 (1936).

175, 208

59. Id. at 511.
60.

Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110,
68 S. Ct. 947, 92 L. Ed. 1245 (1948) ; cf. United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941, 92 L. Ed. 1236 (1948).
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plainly illegal under Section 2 (A) of the Clayton Act before amendment"' and, after amendment, by virtue of the
Robinson-Patman Act.62 Predatory price cutting by a horizontally integrated firm which is attempting to destroy
both competitors and competition in local areas is condemn-

ed in the Indiana Standard case. 3 A monopoly may exist
where there is actual or potential market control." Judge
Learned Hand expressed the doctrine in this language: "...
it is the mere possession of an economic power, acquired by
some form of combination, and capable, by its own variation in production, of changing and controlling price, that
is illegal. It is not necessary in any view that the combination should exclude or be able to exclude all others; .... 5
Viewing A & P's practice of selling below cost in the light
of this decision, it seems clear that the practice is tainted
with illegality when it gives an economic power a competi-

tive advantage which may be used to destroy its competitors. 6

After a court decision holding the profits which ACCO
collected from suppliers of products for A & P illegal under
the Robinson-Patman Act,67 these practices were condemned

in the criminal action against A & P.6" It is clear that these
activities do accentuate the tendency of chain stores toward
monopoly.6" It is also apparent that the decision of the

court in the criminal case had the effect of incorporating
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30
F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858, 49 S. Ct.
353, 73 L. Ed. 999 (1929).
E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6t Cir. 1944).
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), noted in
62 H'Rv. L. REV. 1249 (1949).
United States v. Patten, 187 Fed. 664 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964, 1012
(S.D.N.Y. 1916). Appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on
motion of defendants-appellants, 249 U.S. 621, 39 S. Ct. 291, 63
L. Ed. 805 (1919).
EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 169 (1949).
Great A & P Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 625, 60 S. Ct. 380, 84 L. Ed. 521 (1940).
United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79,
87 (7th Cir. 1949).
FTC, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, supra note
26.
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Section 2(C) of the Robinson-Patman Act into the Sherman Act.
D. Chain Store Activities-Combined IllegalityA Strike at Integration
Participation in a general buying program has been condemned under the Sherman Act. Uniformity of action
"spells a deliberate unlawful system.""0 A combination and
conspiracy to obtain and retain power to exclude competitors is clearly illegal.71
Monopolization cases reveal that the area in which a
monopoly exists may be limited. The area was limited in
the Crescent Amusement Co. case 2 where a local motion
picture exhibition circuit combined to monopolize. In United
States v. Yellow Cab Co.73 a complaint which alleged that
the defendants had monopolized the cab operating business
in four large cities was sustained. The refusal of the manufacturer of linen rugs to permit any purchaser to take away
from it the sole right to supply the United States Government was held to be an illegal attempt to monopolize, although the manufacturer's annual production was less than
one-half of one per cent of the total rug-business in the nation.7"
When the facts disclose that an economic power has secured a dominant position in its industry, and that in some
areas of its trade this corporate giant has adopted a policy
of low gross profit rates so that it may cut prices and obtain an important position in these areas, while in other
areas, where such a position has already been secured among
other giants in the industry, this same dominant corporation adopts a policy of a higher gross profit rate, the rea70. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 337,
339 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); aff'd on this point, rev'd in part and re-

71.
72.
73.
74.

manded on other grounds, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S. Ct. 915, 92 L. Ed.
1260 (1948).
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S. Ct.
1125, 90 L. Ed. 1575 (1946).
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 65 S. Ct.
254, 89 L. Ed. 160 (1944).
332 U.S. 218, 67 S. Ct. 1560, 91 L. Ed. 2010 (1947).
United States v. Klearfax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32, 33
(D. Minn. 1945).
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sonable inference from this comparison is that the low rate
is consistent only with a purpose to fix prices on a less competitive basis once a dominant position has been obtained.
When these facts are viewed in such a setting it is clear that
this course of conduct violates every antitrust law on the
statute books."
Cost differentials cannot be separated from integration.
Therefore, the reasonable conclusion from the court's opinion in the criminal case against A & P is that integration is
per se illegal when it confers a destructive competitive advantage." In other words, the theory of the court seems to
lead inevitably to this conclusion: When integration is the
instrumentality by which control is obtained over the production, manufacture or sale of any article in the market,
and, by such control, the price at which the article may be
sold is dictated and small dealers in the commodity are
driven out of business because they cannot meet the prices
which the integrated business sets, the instrumentality by
which competition is thus destroyed is the target for attack. In this light it is immaterial that the price of an article
may be lowered. It is in the power of the efficiently integrated business to raise it, and the result in any event is unfortunate for the country by depriving it of the services of
a large number of small but independent dealers who are
familiar with the business and who have spent their lives
in it, and who supported themselves and their families from
the small profits realized therein. The fact that they may
be able to find other avenues to earn their livelihood is
not so material, because it is not for the real prosperity of
a democratic country that such changes should occur which
result in transferring an independent businessman, the head
of his establishment even though it may be small, into a
. . . a practice of underselling plaintiff in certain territory
where plaintiff has an established business and maintaining a
higher level of prices in other localities where competition with
plaintiff or other companies is not so keen is a practice condemned by the anti-trust laws . . . . " National Nut Co. v.
Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76, 81 (N.D. Ill. 1945).
76. See Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic
Theory, 63 Q. J. ECON. 238, 249 (1949).

75.
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mere servant or agent of a large efficiently integrated business for selling the commodities which he once manufactured or dealt in, having no voice in shaping the business
policy of the company and bound to obey orders issued by
others. Nor is it for the substantial interests of a democratic country that any commodity should be within the
control and subject to the will of a powerful and integrated
business. The logical and inevitable result of chain store
growth and development leads to the conclusion that efficient integration conferring a competitive advantage is a
per se offense under the Sherman Act.
The above conclusion finds support in this excerpt from
the court's opinion: "The inevitable consequence of this
whole business pattern is to create a chain reaction of everincreasing selling volume and ever-increasing requirements
and hence purchasing power for A & P, and for its competitors hardships not produced by competitive forces, and, conceivably, ultimate extinction." 77
E. Divestiture-An Appropriate Remedy
A finding that a chain organization has violated Section
i of the Sherman Act opens up possibilities of enforcement
beyond mere policing of illegal trade practices to compel
obedience to an injunction. In some cases a mere injunction
against future violations is wholly inadequate because it
leaves the conspirators with all the rewards of their unlawful practices; appropriate divestiture is suggested as a more
feasible remedy." This approach assumes that predatory
practices are the cause of economic power, and, in view of
the fact that courts are reluctant to consider cases of divestiture, there will probably be an inclination to make divestiture applicable only to those cases in which the illegal practices are conspicuously bad and contributed substantially to
the accumulation of power. "Predatory practices," as the
term has often been employed in anti-trust matters, usually
77.
78.

United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79,
88 (7th Cir. 1949).
Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128,
63 S. Ct. 947, 92 L. Ed.. 1245 (1948).
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suggests that a business has savagely exploited economic
advantages to destroy competitors. 0 While the practices of
a chain organization would probably be considered nothing
more or less than "good business" by any local enterprise,
large-scale vertical and horizontal integration, which confer a destructive competitive advantage to the chain, is the
"rotten thread" which injects illegality into chain store
practices. And it is well settled that the Sherman Act looks
not only at the ends employed to crush competition but also
at the means."0 The Government's action in the civil case is
an attack on the means by which A & P acquired a destructive competitive advantage.
The record of A & P's business activities clearly reveals
that injunctive relief will not be enough to prevent A & P's
violations of the Sherman Act. A & P has confessed that it
is incapable of abandoning its illegal practices because of
the mere issuance of a court injunction.
In January of 1938, a cease and desist order was issued
instructing A & P to discontinue its practice of demanding
discriminatory preferences and rebates. The Supreme Court
refused to consider A & P's appeal after this order had been
upheld by the United States Court of Appeals.8 ' Eight years
later, in the criminal anti-trust case, the federal courts found
that A & P had deliberately disregarded the 1938 order
and had continued to exact price preferences from its
sources of supply."
Further evidence of A & P's refusal to abandon its predatory practices is demonstrated by this statement:
"... In 1948 a Federal Grand Jury sitting in Chicago returned two indictments involving, among other things, the payment of d'scriminatory cash rebates to A & P by two milk distributng companies-in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
79. See HANDLER, FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS 79 (TNEC Monograph
38, 1941).
80. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 11, 65 S. Ct. 1416,
89 L. Ed. 2013 (1945).
81. Great A & P Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 625, 60 S.Ct. 380, 84 L. Ed. 521 (1940).
82. United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1949).
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These indictments alleged that in 1942, the year in which the
crininal anti-trust case against A & P was instituted, A & P received $130,000 in secret cash rebates on its purchases of milk
in the Chicago area alone.
"The Grand Jury found that A & P continued to receive
discrin:inatory rebates y-ear after v'ear as the criminal antitrust
case was being fought in the courts. It collected a total of $i,200,000 from these two milk companies in Chicago during the
period from 1942 through 1947. In 1945, the year :n which the
District Court returned its verdict of guilty against A & P in
the criminal antitrust proceedings, A & P's secret rebates from
these two companies amounted to $244,000. In 1947, while the

appeal in the antitrust case was pending in the Court of Appeals,
te Grand jury charged that A & P collected $313,000 in secret
rebates just from these Chicago milk purchases, an amount almost twice as great as the $175,000 in fines that A & P eventually
paid for its antitrust violation.""3

To believe that A & P will discontinue its illegal practices
when a court injunction is issued against it, is absurd when
viewed in the light of this record. The successful frustration
of the series of efforts made by the Federal Trade Commission, the federal courts, the United States Congress, and
the state legislatures and courts, to prevent A & P from
crushing its competitors, has thus led the Department of

Justice to ask for the following, among other things, in
the civil case against A & P: (i) Division of A & P into
seven independent chains; (2) Dissolution of the Atlantic
Commission Company; and (3) Divorcement of A & P's
retail operations from its manufacturing and processing
operations."
If this case is a novel approach to the anti-trust laws it
is certainly time that the approach be taken. However,
nothing new is raised by the case against A & P. It is within
the traditional spirit and intent of our anti-trust laws that
vertical and horizontal integration should be stricken down
83. Excerpt from a speech of Herbert A. Bergson, Assistant Attorney
General, before the Twentieth Quarterly Conference of Operation,
Incorporated, Tuesday, Oct. 18, 1949, Hotel Sheraton, Chicago,
Ill.
84. The Nashville Tennessean, Jan. 22, 1950, p. 6-b, col. 1.
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when they afford the means for the proliferation of monopoly power which already exists.15
F. Implications
This civil suit against A & P will not bring about the dire
consequences that many of the American public are led to
believe. If the Government is successful, A & P will not be
forced to close a single store. Employees will not lose their
jobs. Landlords renting real estate, truckers who provide
trucking service for A & P, farmers, food processors, and
manufacturers will not suffer. A & P will remain as a tenant;
it will still demand trucking service, and it will continue as
an outlet for goods grown, processed and manufactured.86
The vast majority of the American public will probably
reap great benefits if the Government succeeds: A & P will
be unable to obtain preferential rebates from suppliers.
Therefore, the price of merchandise which is sold to A & P's
competitors will be reduced. Competition will then succeed
in passing these reductions in price on to the consumers.
The 9o% or more who buy from A & P's competitors will
be benefited as well as the A & P customers in areas where
A & P stores are being deliberately operated at a loss to
crush competition.87
The purpose of the civil action against A & P is to insure
the advantages of competition in the grocery field. This is
not a strike at all integrated businesses. It is merely a strike
at large-scale efficient integration which is destructive of
the advantages which flow to the American public from
competition.
85.

United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224
U.S. 383, 32 S. Ct. 507, 56 L. Ed. 810 (1912). "[the court] . . .
seemingly takes the position that the mere existence of the power
of exclusion, although not exercised, is violative of the Act."
Handler, Industrial Mergers and The Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL.
L. REv. 179, 205 (1932).
86. Remarks by J. Howard McGrath, Attorney General of the United
States, prepared for delivery before the Connecticut State Bar
Association, Hartford Club, Hartford, Conn., Tuesday, Oct. 18,
1949.
87. Speech by Hon. Wright Patman of Texas, in the House of Representatives, 95 Cong. Rec. 14334 (Oct. 6, 1949).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has not yet said that
integration standing alone is a per se offense under the
Sherman Act. It can hardly be endured that the law remain
in this present state. The logic of events is certain to bring
about a change either by continued judicial construction of
the Sherman Act or by legislation. The principle of integration appears inherently sound. Properly applied, the principle provides for progressive commercial methods and results in lower prices. Nevertheless, the real "evil" of integation is its superior efficiency, for efficiency makes it impossible for the non-integrated business to compete. For other
firms to become integrated also, and to attain efficiency,
will not solve the problem because this would lead to complete suppression of the market. The doctrine that monopoly power through the instrumentality of vertical or horizontal integration eliminates competition, is absolute. However, integration which has become uneconomical and inefficient does not eliminate competition. Consequently, integration which breeds inefficiency has less to fear from judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act than the efficiently
integrated business. The real "evil" of the large efficiently
integrated concern lies in the power of the combination to
do as it pleases. The dissolution of all existing vertical or
horizontal combinations, or the prohibition of all new ones,
is not required to eradicate this evil. Only the dissolution
of the large efficiently integrated concern is required."8
The law must strike, not at the principle of integration
alone, but at large and efficiently integrated concerns so as
to prevent further expansion of a monopoly power which
already exists. The obvious and direct method of proceeding to attack large efficiently integrated concerns is to render them fairly susceptible to competition. This does not
mean that fictitious competition should be instigated or sustained. It means only that actual and bona fide competition should be given opportunity to enter the field,
88. Adelman, Integration and Anti-Trust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REv.
27 (1949); cf. Mason, Current Status of the Monopoly Problem
in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1269 (1949).
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and, when it has done so, it should be "fought" only
by fair and proper methods. To this end combinations
should be forbidden to fight competitors: (a) by lowering
the selling price in one part of the country to kill off local
competition, while maintaining prices elsewhere; (b) by
refusing to deal with persons who are competing or intending to compete or who refuse to accept restrictive terms;
and (c) generally, by discriminations of one sort or another. Under a court decision explicitly declaring that largescale efficient integration, which affords a means for the
expansion of monopoly power which already exists, is a
per se offense under the Sherman Act, not only would it
appear that the Robinson-Patman Act with all of its elusive uncertainty is unnecessary, but it would also appear
that the enactment of additional federal legislation would
be unnecessary to achieve these purposes.
If the Government's present civil action should end in a
decision for A & P, the present Congress may pass a law
prohibiting sales below cost. Sales below cost laws, as well
as the Miller-Tydings Act, have proved to be nothing more
than directives for collusive price-fixing arrangements. 9 It
presently appears that any legislation which might be enacted to prevent sales below cost would be consistent with
the doctrine of the Department of Justice that successful
integration should be attacked whenever it gives an integrated business an opportunity to use integration as the
instrumentality for crushing competitors."
Whatever else may be said about integration as applied
to other forms of business enterprise, it may be confidently
asserted that legislative attempts to cure the objections to
chain stores will always be unsuccessful because these objections arise from the very nature of the organization."
Consequently, the tremendous significance of the Government's present civil actions against A & P and its two
89. Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 391 (1948).
90. See Report of the Committee on Small Business on Monopolistic
and Unfair Trade Practices, H. R. REP. No. 2465, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1948).
91. Collins, Anti-Chain Store Legislation, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 198, 213
(1939).
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largest competitors lies in the fact that judicial interpretation of the broad language of the Sherman Act provides the
only present effective solution of the chain store problem.
A decision for the Government would strike a tremendous
blow against concerted chain store economic power.
A program designed to protect small business from successful integration may well be undertaken provided that
large scale efficient integration is the target for attack, and
assuming that the dangers of pushing such a policy to the
extent that we protect competitors from it rather than maintain competition are recognized. In formulating a policy
with respect to integration, it should be remembered that
it is the size and financial resources of a business which enable it to destroy competitors."

92.
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